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This paper replicates and extends a well known model of quantifying categorical 
fungibility of foreign aid to study the effect of aid on government consumption, 
magnitude and composition of government investment and revenue mobilization 
in Nepal. I find that aid intended for a particular sector has, by and large, been 
spent within that sector and, in fact, induced the government to augment its 
spending on that particular sector for most categories studied. This broadly 
corroborates the evidence on the “flypaper effect” of aid not just at the 
aggregate level but also at the sectoral level. I also find that aid has enhanced 
the government’s revenue effort but not quite to the extent that would enable the 
government to self-finance the inflating government consumption, which, I find, 
has a strong positive aid elasticity. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
When Nepal broke out of isolation and emerged as a modern state 
in 1951, it inherited more than the vestiges of its quasi-feudal history. The 
rugged terrain and highly dispersed population along with the high ethno-
linguistic fractionalization would have posed significant challenges to any 
administration of the time and Nepal hardly even had one. Only two 
percent of the adult population was literate. Infant mortality was more than 
60 percent, and average life expectancy was thirty-five years. Less than 
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one percent of the population was engaged in modern industrial 
occupations, and 85 percent of employment and income came from 
agriculture, mostly performed by tenants using archaic methods and 
working under uncertain contracts. There were only around 100 kilometers 
of railroad tracks and a few kilometers of paved roads in the entire nation. 
Telephones, electricity and postal services combined served only one 
percent of the population and only in certain pockets. Nepali currency 
circulated only in and around the Kathmandu valley.  Government 
expenditures went almost entirely for salaries and benefits for the army, 
police and civil servants, with any savings going to the prime minister. 
Health and education received less than one percent of government 
expenditures1.   
It was against this backdrop that the United States Operations 
Mission (USOM) – following the doctrines of President Truman’s Four 
Point Program – offered to provide Nepal the technical assistance to 
combat malaria and to conduct a geological survey for mineral resources. 
Nepal could not refuse. The aid industry that started thus grew at a rapid 
pace throughout the 50s, 60s and the 70s. India built the international 
airport in Kathmandu and initiated a whole host of roads and irrigation 
projects. The Swiss got involved in dairy development. In line with the 
import-substituting orthodoxy of the time, China helped set up a number 
of industries most notably shoe, brick, and tile factories. The Soviet Union 
wasn’t far behind; it helped construct cigarette and sugar factories. 
Meanwhile, the United States continued to remain involved in village 
development, agriculture and public health (Mihaly, 2002). In the mid-
eighties the multilaterals entered the scene with the advent of the era of 
stabilization, structural adjustment and policy lending. Although the 
predominant nature of aid had changed, its economic importance to Nepal 
only increased and donors continued to jostle for space in a country that 
had become a hospitable laboratory to various aid experiments. Even 
today, Nepal continues to rely heavily on foreign assistance; two thirds of 
the country’s development spending or about a third of the government’s 
total budget is financed by foreign aid2.  
It is clear from Nepal’s foreign aid history that aid has been the 
principal source of the country’s development finance. Additionally, 
because of its inchoate initial conditions, Nepal offers an ideal case study 
for the investigation of the development effectiveness of aid. Yet, it is 
surprising to note that serious empirical research aiming to establish any 
economic consequence of foreign aid in Nepal is practically non-existent3. 
This paper is a step in the effort to fill this void.  
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I replicate a model well known in the foreign aid fungibility 
literature to study the impact of aid on various fiscal and public 
expenditure aggregates. The motivation is two-fold. On the one hand, in 
view of the country-specific peculiarities overlooked by highly aggregated 
studies that use a heterogeneous4 sample of countries and donor databases 
like the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the 
IMF’s GFS, this study adds to the shallow pool of literature of country-
specific studies that make use of domestic data sources. Secondly, by 
empirically establishing a clear historical picture of how aid has affected 
government consumption – which I proxy in this paper with the series on 
regular expenditure – the magnitude and composition of investments 
(development expenditure) and revenue mobilization in Nepal, this study 
will hope to concretize implications for aid management policies in the 
future. The rest of the paper is structured in the following manner. Section 
II briefly reviews the existing aid effectiveness literature. Section III lays 
out the empirical strategies and summarizes key regression results. A 
detailed analysis of the results follows in Section IV. Section V attempts 
to reconcile the findings within the public expenditure context of the 
country and finally, Section VI summarizes and concludes. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Academic enquiry into the development effectiveness of foreign 
aid has shifted in focus in the last decade. Orthodox savings and foreign 
exchange gap theories that provided starting points for the early aid-
growth literature – in the tradition of Chenery and Strout (1966) and 
Griffin (1970) – have given way to studies that focus on institutional and 
policy gaps (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). This move is partly a 
consequence of the setting in of “aid fatigue” in most rich countries. 
Confronted by a confluence of fiscal shocks in their own economies after 
the Cold War, these donor countries – with considerable squeeze in their 
aid budgets – were forced to bring the development performance of their 
outlays into closer scrutiny. Although Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) 
conclusion that aid is effective and growth-enhancing in countries that 
have “good” policy environments has been questioned on several grounds 
by Hansen and Tarp (2001) and shown not to be supported by an updated 
data set by Easterly et al. (2003), it has had a profound impact on the 
market for development finance and remains, quite ostensibly, the most 
dominant guiding principle for development interventions5. 
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Even before one gets into the debate of whether or not good 
policies are a pre-requisite for aid effectiveness, however, the question as 
to what constitutes a “good” policy environment is itself vulnerable to 
subjective interpretation. While policies that ensure macroeconomic 
stability and promote openness in trade are universally accepted necessary 
conditions for growth, the extents to which factors like the quality of 
governance, political stability and conflict figure into the policy variable is 
unclear. This unresolved debate on the effect of aid on growth conditional 
to the quality of the policy environment notwithstanding, economists have 
increasingly acknowledged the fact that since “aid” is mostly given to 
sovereign “governments”, the effect of aid on an economy is moderated 
through the public sector. Hence, public expenditure pattern and the 
overall fiscal response to aid have started gaining acceptance as the 
important determinant of success or failure of development policy 
objectives of aid.  
Studies that deal squarely with the impact of aid on the public 
sector fiscal behavior of the recipient government can be divided into two 
broad categories. The first category concerns itself primarily with the 
fungibility of aid. Fungibility – loosely defined as the ability of the 
recipient government to divert development assistance intended by donors 
for a specific sector towards expenditures into some other sector – is not a 
new concept6. Donors have been concerned about it at least since the 
1960s (World Bank, 1998). It is only recently, however, that this concern 
– that the fungibility of aid might be leading to unproductive expenditures 
at the margin and thereby, undermining its desired development outcome 
– has prompted a spate of studies aiming to establish the empirical 
groundings of fungibility in practice. 
Feyziouglu et al. (1998) and Devarajan et al. (1999) find that most 
sectoral aid is at least partially fungible in a cross country context7. Pack 
and Pack (1990), on the other hand, find little evidence to support 
fungibilty of sectoral assistance to Indonesia. Aid to the Dominican 
Republic and Pakistan are evidenced to have been siphoned off to finance 
other less desirable expenditure headings, namely, deficit reduction, debt 
service and tax relief in Pack and Pack (1993) and Khiliji and Zampelli 
(1991) respectively. Therefore, broadly, there seems to be a general 
agreement in the literature that sectoral aid may, in fact, be financing 
something entirely different at the margin. The dominant implication for 
policy as expounded in Feyziouglu et al. (1998) is that aid ought to be tied 
to an overall public expenditure program that not only ensures sufficient 
funds for crucial development activities but also creates a space for the 
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fostering of local capacity. World Bank (1998) qualifies it further; “those 
(countries) with efficient public sectors can receive budget support, while 
those with inefficient public sectors would get relatively less money and 
more ideas”. 
The other stream of research, popularly known in the literature as 
the “fiscal response” models, is more interested in how aid affects broader 
fiscal aggregates such as revenue mobilization, government consumption 
and domestic borrowing. Most fiscal response models problemetize the 
residual treatment of domestic borrowing in country specific fungibility 
studies and following the methodological footsteps of Heller (1975) strive 
to capture the impact on domestic borrowing endogenously. Mosley et al 
(1987) and Gang and Khan (1991) are some early examples. Franco-
Rodriguez et al (1998) further enhance these models by making aid 
decisions themselves endogenous (See McGillivray and Morrissey (2001) 
for a comprehensive review of this literature). This paper falls in the first 
category. 
 
Empirical Strategy 
A. Setting Up 
I replicate what is perhaps the best known, yet the simplest 
categorical fungibility model in the literature: Pack and Pack (1990, 1993). 
This is not just because their model lends itself nicely to an explicit 
calculation of an inter-sectoral fungibility measure but also because 
closely following their model allows for the comparison of results with the 
two countries they have already studied. The government, assumed to be a 
“collective decision making body”, optimizes on a set of community 
indifference curves and a corresponding budget constraint. Various 
equations representing demand functions are then determined and in our 
case, they are as follows: 
 
),,(
),(
),,( ,,,
TIMETFAGDPfREV
TFAGDPfREG
OFAFAGDPfDEV
ttt
ttt
tititti
=
=
=
 (1) 
 
where DEVi, t denotes public development investment in expenditure 
category i, REGt represents public consumption under the heading of 
regular expenditures and REVt denotes own source revenue. Similarly, 
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GDPt  is current price gross domestic product for year t, FAi,t is categorical 
foreign aid for expenditure category i, and OFAi, t is “other” foreign aid 
and TIME is a time dummy while TFAt is total foreign aid8. 
Now, each of the equations in system (1) are related to and must 
satisfy the following budget identity, 
   (2) DEFREVTFAREGDEV tttt
i
ti ++=+∑ ,
where DEFt is the size of the deficit (or surplus) financing. Debt servicing 
payments, which comprise roughly about 30% of the regular expenditures9 
are assumed to be exogenous since they depend on borrowing patterns in 
earlier periods. Here, I allow debt servicing payments to remain embedded 
in regular expenditure. Deficits are determined within the system but it is 
the omitted equation since system (1) is estimable in itself using 
seemingly unrelated regressions, SUR.  SUR is preferable because it 
allows for the estimation of the simultaneous equations system (1) without 
the specification of any particular functional form. 
B. Assumptions 
Two assumptions are necessary to preclude possibilities of 
simultaneity bias in the above system. First, GDP is assumed to be 
exogenous for if it were not, and if changes in government consumption 
were to induce changes in GDP, then the above model would produce 
biased estimates for the coefficient of GDP. Second, foreign assistance too 
has to be exogenous of the system for the same reason. Are these 
assumptions tenable in the context of Nepal for the period of this study? 
There are reasons to believe so. First, notwithstanding some demand-side 
aspects in the nature of income growth in Nepal during the period covered 
in this study, given low levels of public saving and investment, inadequate 
technological innovation and persistently low productivity, government 
consumption demand might have contributed little to GDP growth.  
Similarly, the second assumption regarding the exogeneity of 
foreign assistance too is plausible. Although there is no doubt that Nepal 
would have had to compete for funds against other similarly needy 
countries across the globe, the proximate factors determining these cross-
country allocations, however, would be outside the purview of our model. 
For example, Behrman and Sah (1984) show that it is not just the size of a 
country’s GDP but its size relative to other countries that influences aid 
flows. Even if it were not, the purported impact of changes in income 
performance on aid flows would most likely occur with a lag further 
diminishing the possibility of aid being endogenous. Therefore, for our 
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purposes here the assumption that aid to Nepal has been fairly “easily 
available” and not been subject to the performance of any particular 
macroeconomic variable in our model is fairly robust10.  
C. Estimates for Nepal 
Using data available from the Economic Survey of various years, 
time series of total foreign aid disbursed and corresponding government 
investments are constructed for a twenty five year period between 1976 
and 2001 for five categories: social services, rural development, 
infrastructure, commerce and industry and miscellaneous others. 
Investment in social services include spendings on such areas as 
education, health and drinking water facilities while rural development 
comprises of agriculture, irrigation and forestry related expenditures. 
Similarly, infrastructure contains government spending on building road 
networks, hydropower plants and communication facilities. Commerce 
and industry comprises mainly of subsidies, transfers and other investment 
expenditures and the remaining expenditure headings – a hodgepodge 
mainly constituting development expenditures in miscellaneous areas – are 
amalgamated in “Others”.  
All variables except time are regressed in first differenced log per 
capita form11. Table 1 summarizes key regression results. There seems to 
be, in general an excellent fit with adjusted R-squared values ranging from 
0.53 to 0.99. The Durbin-Watson statistics for most equations – barring a 
couple (Others and regular expenditure) – are within acceptable bounds.  
As would be expected, there seems to be a significant positive impact of 
own foreign aid (FAi) on development expenditures in all categories 
except “others”. This means, aid given to the social sector for example, 
increases the government’s own investment in the sector. Interestingly, 
however, three out of five OFA coefficients are significantly positive. This 
can be construed as evidence for the diversion of foreign aid categorically 
given to some development expenditure categories to others. For example, 
the amount the government has spent on rural development seems not only 
to be positively correlated with aid received specifically for rural 
development, but augmented by aid disbursed through other expenditure 
headings. Since coefficients are elasticities, the combined net effect of 
“own” and “other” foreign aid will determine whether for each 
development expenditure category aid is in fact fungible or not. I will 
replicate the simulation in Pack and Pack (1990, 1993) in the following 
section to determine exact extent of categorical fungibility.  
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TABLE 1--- The Estimated Model: EXPENDITURES AND REVENUE 
                       DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE     
  Rural Social  Commerce   
  Development Services Infrastructure and Industry Others 
Constant 0.103 -1.016* 0.957 -4.021** -2.909 
GDP 0.211 0.344** -0.027 0.915** 0.178 
Foreign Aid (FA) 0.524*** 0.359*** 0.782*** 0.286*** 0.005 
Other Foreign Aid  
(OFA) 0.158** 0.323*** 0.132* -0.148 0.702 
Adjusted R-squared 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.74 0.53 
D-W 1.99 1.78 2.25 1.94 1.51 
  REGULAR    
  EXPENDITURE REVENUE   
 Constant -3.815*** -0.535   
 GDP 1.064** 0.687***   
 
Total Foreign
Aid (TFA) 0.202*** 0.013   
 Time  0.054***   
 
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.99 0.99   
 D-W 1.59 1.87   
***  Significant at less than 1%;  **   Significant at less than 5%; *   Significant at less than 10%.  
The last two equations for government consumption and revenue 
yield some interesting results as well. Positive and significant coefficients 
on both GDP and total foreign aid (TFA) indicate that government 
consumption in Nepal has had a tendency to move in the same direction as 
GDP and total foreign aid. The coefficient on total foreign aid in the 
revenue equation is positive (albeit insignificant) indicating that aid to 
Nepal might have provided some impetus for a greater revenue effort. 
While the positive coefficient on GDP is expected as the tax base 
plausibly broadens as incomes increase, the positive coefficient on the 
time variable affirms enhancement of revenue effort through 
improvements in administration and policy. 
Interpreting the Results 
Using elasticity coefficients obtained from the above regression the 
effect on sectoral development expenditures of a rupee change in total 
foreign aid, proportionally allocated according to historical averages 
among expenditure categories can be estimated using the following 
method. Disregarding other control variables,   
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The same is true for ∂ lnDEVi/∂ lnOFAi. 
Now, the effect on each development expenditure category of a 
rupee change in aid is given by,  
dOFAOFA
DEVdFAFA
DEVdDEV i
i
i
ii
i
i
ii
••+••= ββ 21  
where dFAi and dOFAi are taken to be pro-rated changes in aid to 
respective expenditure categories. For example, dFA for rural 
development would simply be the mean share of aid stipulated for rural 
development in total aid. Therefore, from this setup, a calculated change in 
an expenditure category that is smaller than the pro-rated change for a 
particular sector would indicate diversion of aid away from this sector. 
Table 2 summarizes this calculation for the five development spending 
categories, regular expenditures and revenue. 
 
Table 2---Changes in Expenditure and Revenue in Response to Prorated 
Changes in Aid 
   Change in Total Change 
Expenditure Prorated Change Expenditure in Expenditure 
Category in Foreign Aid Or Revenue Or Revenue 
Rural Development    
FA 0.242 0.250  
OFA  0.075 0.325** 
Infrastructure    
FA 0.474 0.481  
OFA  0.081 0.563** 
Social Services    
FA 0.225 0.220  
OFA  0.198 0.418* 
Commerce & Industry    
FA 0.055 0.042  
OFA  -0.022 0.02* 
Others    
FA 0.004 0.000  
OFA  0.041 0.041* 
Regular Expenditure    
TFA  0.415 0.415* 
Domestic Revenue    
TFA  0.030 0.030 
** = Significant at less than 5%; * =Significant at less than 10% 
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Despite evidence of some reshuffling of aid monies across sectors, 
in aggregate there seems to be little evidence of categorical fungibility: in 
all headings except commerce and industry, aid induced sectoral 
expenditures are larger than pro-rated ones12. Rather than using aid money 
allocated categorically for a particular sector to finance development 
spending in some other development expenditure category, aggregated 
results show that the government has in fact augmented aided projects and 
sectors with its own resources. According to these results, a rupee given in 
aid to Nepal has increased development expenditures by Rs. 1.3613. 
Similarly, the effect on regular expenditure – of which debt servicing 
payments is a component – has been an increase by 41 paisa14. Aid has a 
positive impact on own-source revenue as well. A rupee given in aid 
increases the revenue effort by 3 paise. So in aggregate, out of the Rs.1.77 
increase in total government spending, only 3 paisa is financed by a 
corresponding increase in own source (non aid) revenue! In our model, the 
rest is naturally being financed by a deficit. I shall return to this issue in 
the following section. 
Speaking strictly of intersectoral fungibility then, there doesn’t 
seem to be much for donors to worry about as most of their project or 
sector aid seems to be spent on areas they intended for it to be spent. In 
comparison to other country specific categorical fungibility studies, this 
finding isn’t surprising. One of the reasons Pack and Pack (1993) attribute 
to the presence of fungibility is the extent of aid dependence in each 
country; the greater the aid component of total government expenditures 
the greater the ability of donors to track their outlays in the government’s 
spending package. This is a plausible argument and is supported by our 
finding here as well. For the time period analyzed in this paper Nepal’s 
total government spending as a percentage of GDP averages 19%. With 
30% of this being financed by external assistance, Nepal’s aid dependence 
is higher than both Indonesia and the Dominican Republic during the time 
period studied by Pack and Pack (1990, 1993)15.  
 
Discussion 
In light of the evidence above, it is tempting to conclude that the 
notion of intersectoral fungibility as an explanatory factor of low 
effectiveness of aid doesn’t hold up to scrutiny, at least for the case of 
Nepal. By and large, aid allocated for a particular sector seems to have 
been spent within that sector. But although I have rejected categorical 
fungibility, the simple fact (which has been adequately established above) 
that a certain proportion of aid allocated purely for development 
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investments is channeled into financing government consumption is in 
itself evidence of the government treating sectoral aid as fungible as its 
own revenue. Furthermore, this leads to an important question that needs 
to be answered: Would the government have taken up some of these 
development projects if its “own source revenue” were the only available 
source of financing? In other words, yes, development expenditure in most 
categories has gone up in response to aid for those respective categories, 
but to what extent are these expenditures “owned” by the government? 
As in most of the developing world, the quantity of public 
expenditures has hardly been an issue in the case of Nepal16. Quality and 
ownership of development projects, on the other hand, have been 
instrumental to determining their success. I introduce a minor innovation 
to the simulation done in Section IV to make an illustration. Constraining 
total government expenditures (both regular and development) to remain 
unchanged in response to a rupee in aid, or in other words, normalizing the 
expenditure increases, we can calculate how that marginal rupee of aid – 
broken down into sectoral priorities of donors – induces changes in the 
composition of government spending. The result, as shown in Figure 1., 
offers an insight into the relative priorities accorded to each expenditure 
category by both the donors and the recipient government. 
0
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Figure 1. shows the compositional change a rupee undergoes from 
the time it is given as aid to the time it translates into public expenditure 
under the restrictive assumption that there is no increase aggregate 
spending levels. It is clear that significant proportions are transferred from 
their initial allocations to rural development, infrastructure and commerce 
and industry to fund regular expenditures. But, we know from previous 
sections that the “no rise in total expenditure” assumption is not only 
restrictive, but untrue. I have shown that not only does every rupee in aid 
increase total expenditure by 1.77 paisa, but expenditure in all headings 
except commerce and industry go up simultaneously. This has two 
interrelated consequences. 
First, the issue of “ownership” of development expenditure is 
implicated as perhaps the most important challenge to aid effectiveness. 
Donors have a good mechanism to track and monitor their assistances 
within the government’s expenditure program. But coupled with the fact 
that there is a clear mismatch of relative sectoral priorities between donors 
and the government of Nepal on how the marginal rupee of aid should be 
spent, the aggregate increase in sectoral spending would be an indication 
of donor imposition against the wishes the government. The result is a glut 
of projects in the infrastructure, rural development and commerce and 
industry sectors with little ownership of the government. 
Second consequence that has similarly perverse implications for 
the effectiveness of public expenditures arises from the institutional 
incentives to use aid commitments to leverage and over-program the 
development portfolio. World Bank (2000) explores this aspect in a great 
detail. Analyzing project level allocations and spending, it finds that 
between projects that are entirely government initiated and owned and 
projects that are donor financed with about 10-20% government 
contribution in the form of counterpart funding, ex ante there is a clear 
tendency to allocate a major chunk of the local currency resources towards 
the latter17. But when donor funded projects suffer setbacks from expected 
delays in disbursements and procedural factors due to weak ownership, the 
resources initially earmarked to finance the government’s share of these 
projects fall prey and succumb to political jockeying. Consequently, a 
large number of projects with questionable feasibility and weak 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms may end up being funded in place 
of slow moving, albeit properly monitored donor ones. In this respect, 
therefore, it seems that given the realities of the expenditure management 
practices in Nepal, sector aid does have the ability to free up domestic 
resources that can then be channeled to areas that may not necessarily be 
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as alarming as say, military expenditures, debt and/or tax relief18, as this 
study doesn’t distinguish among those, but can, nonetheless undermine the 
effectiveness of the overall spending package. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have highlighted some interesting empirical 
implications of foreign aid in Nepal by subjecting a borrowed model to 
domestic data. The most striking finding is that about a quarter of a dollar 
received as foreign aid in Nepal has been spent on government 
consumption and the rest on development expenditures. This is the exact 
opposite of what Feyzioglu et al. (1998) find in their study of 14 
developing countries – two thirds of a dollar in aid was used for 
government consumption in their sample. I also find strong evidence to 
support the flypaper effect of aid in not just aggregate public expenditures 
but also on most development expenditure categories I study. Considered 
together, increased government consumption does not seem to have come 
necessarily at the cost of development investment. This is contrary to 
popular wisdom. According to our hypothesis it is the high aid elasticity of 
government investment that seems problematic in the case of Nepal. This 
is paradoxical but plausible since on the one hand strong donor 
supervision in an environment of obvious misalignment of sectoral 
preference between donors and the government on how the marginal unit 
of aid should be spent, a lot of projects with weak government 
“ownership” end up being financed. On the other hand, aid frees up the 
government’s own resources allowing it to invest on projects and 
programs that would otherwise not have been financed and are often of 
low economic rates of return.  
One limitation of this model is that it treats domestic borrowing as 
a residual and can only infer the impact of aid on domestic borrowing; it 
cannot establish it directly. Future empirical work could be directed at 
explicitly modeling and testing the impact of aid on domestic borrowing 
along the lines of some of the fiscal response models discussed in Section 
II. Additionally, combining empirics with the study of institutional 
arrangements surrounding disbursement mechanisms and aid related 
budget management processes unique to Nepal may provide fertile frontier 
for future research in this area and may become a useful extension of this 
study. 
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Notes 
 
1 All numbers quoted from “Library of Congress Country Studies: Nepal” 
(Washington D.C. Library of Congress, 1991) p. 42.  
2 Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, His Majesty’s Government of Nepal. 
3 Joshi (1996) is an exception but is focused more on the impact of aid on 
macroeconomic variables like trade, savings and growth. 
4 Heterogeneity arising from varying dependence on aid and the quality of budget 
implementation processes.  
5 For example, the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) initiative announced 
by President Bush at the Inter-American Development Bank in March 2002, is 
steeped with the Burnside and Dollar (2000) message. His call for a “new 
compact for global development” is predicated on “a new accountability for both 
rich and poor nations alike” and fittingly the MCA funds are “devoted to projects 
in nations that govern justly, invest in their people and encourage economic 
freedom”. 
6 “When the World Bank thinks it is financing an electric power station, it is 
really financing a brothel”. Paul Rosenstein-Rodan in 1947. Quoted in Devarajan 
et al. (1999).  
7 For example Feyziouglu et al. (1998) – in their sample of 14 countries for 
which aid wasn’t fungible at the aggregate level –   find that earmarked 
concessionary loans to the agriculture, energy and education sectors are diverted 
to other uses while loans to transportation and communication sectors are fully 
spent as per the donors’ intention.  
8 The “other” foreign aid, OFAi, t is defined as (TFAt – FA i, t).  
9 Nepal Public Expenditure Review, World Bank, 2000.  
10 (i) Nepal Public Expenditure Review, World Bank 2000 (Pg. 13) 
(ii) Alesina and Dollar (2000) finds that more than just economic considerations 
aid flows also depend on political and strategic considerations. Although it is 
likely that Nepal’s transition into democratic governance in 1990 was duly 
supported and rewarded by donors this possibility is unlikely to affect our model.  
11 Note here that all variables are used in nominal terms to make these results 
comparable to similar country studies in the literature.  
12 This result however needs to be taken with caution for there is clear evidence 
in the data that the sectoral mix of the total aid basket has changed considerably 
in the twenty five year period being analyzed here. For example from 15% of 
total aid in 1976 to 31% of total aid in 2001, foreign assistance to the social 
services has more than doubled. Aid to commerce and industry on the other hand, 
has gone down from 12% in 1976 to as low as 0.1% in 2001.  
13 This is evidence in support of the “flypaper effect” of foreign aid. When the 
government receives a dollar in aid it has the option to (i) increase spending 
dollar for dollar; (ii) reduce taxes dollar for dollar, and; (iii) leave spending and 
taxes unchanged and use the aid to reduce the deficit (World Bank 1996). 
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Flypaper effect of aid occurs when the government uses the aid to leverage 
spending. 
14 Devarajan et al. (1998) find that aid to Africa increase current and capital 
spending in equal amounts.  
15 Public expenditures were 14% and 23% of GDP and foreign aid equaled 19% 
and 8% respectively in Indonesia and the Dominican Republic respectively. 
16 Nepal Public Expenditure Review (2000) emphasizes this point from various 
sectoral angles.  
17 Rationing of local currency resources may seem an innocuous fiscal measure 
but in countries like Nepal where budget procedures are weak, and donor-
government information asymmetries are high, perverse incentives arise to use 
“freed up” cash to finance projects with implications no other than political. 
18 Devarajan et al (1998), Khilji and Zampelli (1994) and Pack and Pack(1993).  
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